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Subsidiaries of a firm can use their reporting discretion for several goals, such as reporting 
earnings comparable to other subsidiaries or reporting earnings that are smooth over time.  Prior 
theoretical work on reporting discretion recognizes the tension among these goals (Holmstrom, 
1982; Demski and Sappington, 1974), but empirical work has not sufficiently examined it. This 
study exploits the bank holding company setting to investigate how subsidiaries use reporting 
discretion to navigate these competing objectives. I find that while subsidiaries use reporting 
discretion to smooth their own earnings, they also use reporting discretion to herd around the 
earnings of internal peers. Through a number of cross-sectional analyses, I find that this herding 
behavior appears consistent with relative performance evaluation motivations. These results 





Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Subsidiaries of a firm can use their reporting discretion for several goals, which include 
reporting earnings comparable to other subsidiaries or reporting smooth patterns of earnings. Prior 
theoretical work on reporting discretion recognizes tension between these objectives (Holmstrom, 
1982; Demski and Sappington, 1974), but empirical work has not sufficiently examined how a 
subsidiary weighs these objectives in its reporting process. One reason for this omission could be 
that, in the absence of the knowledge of implicit and explicit benchmarks established by the parent 
for its subsidiaries, it is difficult to disentangle the reporting objectives of the subsidiary from the 
economic realities of the organization. Another reason for this omission could be that empirical 
researchers lack good segment data for subsidiaries. Segment data, even where available, is rarely 
uniformly comparable due to the potential heterogeneous nature of the various operations of the 
subsidiaries.  In this study, I exploit the bank holding company setting, which provides a number 
of institutional and economic advantages, to investigate the extent to which subsidiaries use 
reporting discretion to manage these potentially competing objectives. In particular, I examine 
how bank holding company subsidiaries use reporting discretion to 1) offset variations in their 
own earnings, 2) respond to contemporaneous earnings of internal peers, and 3) respond to 
contemporaneous earnings of external peers.  I show that these reporting choices are likely driven 
by relative performance evaluation considerations.  
Bank holding companies (BHCs) are often composed of at least one, but sometimes more, 
commercial bank subsidiaries, and the BHC structure comes with a number of benefits apart from 
the ownership and operation of bank subsidiaries (see Section 2.1). In addition to regulatory 
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requirements at the BHC level, BHC subsidiaries also face their own regulatory reporting and 
examination requirements, making subsidiary financials uniformly available. The banking 
business model is also relatively homogenous, despite differences in the lending and depository 
environments across banks, with loan loss provisions being the major mechanism banks use to 
exercise reporting discretion. Within a multi-subsidiary setting, the performance of one subsidiary 
could be endogenous to the performance of its internal peers if the headquarters moves cash 
between subsidiaries for performance reasons. In my sample, BHCs primarily shift funds from 
their subsidiaries to the BHC, and rarely from one subsidiary to another, suggesting this form of 
endogeneity is not a concern (see Sections 3.2 and 4.2.3).  
Given the importance of the loan loss provision as a period-end accrual in the banking 
industry, I operationalize reporting discretion by examining the extent to which loan loss 
provisions offset variations in pre-provision earnings at the subsidiary level, which is standard in 
the literature (see Beatty and Liao, 2014, for a review). In addition, I use reporting discretion to 
examine the extent to which subsidiaries match, or herd around, the earnings of their internal peers 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). 
My sample includes 1,245 subsidiaries from 505 bank holding companies with more than 
one subsidiary for the period from 2009 through 2018. I begin my analyses by first examining how 
bank holding companies use their reporting discretion in the loan loss provision to smooth 
earnings, as prior studies have found mixed results (Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995; Beatty 
et al., 2002; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Bushman and Williams, 2012). My results suggest that reporting 
discretion in the loan loss provision to smooth earnings is marginally more prominent at BHCs 
with only one commercial bank subsidiary, compared to BHCs with more than one subsidiary. The 
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presence of multiple subsidiaries has an effect on BHC-level reporting discretion, and offers 
insight into why the prior literature has found mixed evidence at the holding company level. 
I next turn to the reporting behavior of individual BHC subsidiaries, examining the extent 
to which they smooth their own earnings and also try to match their peers’ earnings. Consistent 
with prior subsidiary-level findings, I find that subsidiaries use reporting discretion to smooth their 
own earnings (Beatty and Harris, 2001). When pre-provision earnings are higher relative to a 
subsidiary’s own time-series mean, the subsidiary increases its own loan loss provision. I also find 
that, in contrast to the smoothing response to its own pre-provision earnings, a subsidiary records 
smaller loan loss provisions when the pre-provision earnings of its internal peers are high. This 
result suggests that subsidiaries use their reporting discretion to match their internal peers’ reported 
performance. When aggregated to the BHC level, this behavior could lead to the non-smooth 
earnings documented in prior literature (Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999).  
I include subsidiary level fixed effects, as well as quarter fixed effects, in these above 
regressions to account for any subsidiary-specific, and time-series, factors that may impact loan 
loss provisions and all other variables. Still, it is possible that these results are driven not by 
reporting discretion exercised by the subsidiary, but rather by some unmodeled economic reality 
faced by the BHC and its subsidiaries. I perform a number of additional analyses to address these 
potential competing explanations, and show that this herding behavior is likely a result of reporting 
discretion exercised at the subsidiary level. 
I next examine the effect of external peer groups by controlling for the performance of a 
peer group comprised of banks with similar asset sizes and operations located in a similar 
geographic region. I find that a subsidiary’s loan loss provision has a significant positive relation 
with the loan loss provisions of this broader set of peers, consistent with Dahl (2013), but has a 
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relation to the pre-provision earnings of these peers in a direction opposite of a subsidiary’s 
response to its internal peers. I also find that the herding result does not hold for randomly assigned 
internal and external peer groups, suggesting that my herding results are not spurious. 
Since I do not have direct data on managerial motives, I exploit various economic features 
of the BHC setting in an attempt to identify the motivation for the herding behavior. I first test 
whether the herding behavior appears symmetrically around positive and negative earnings (Desir, 
2012; Bratten et al., 2016). I find that my results are asymmetric, with subsidiaries more inclined 
to match loan loss provisions to negative pre-provision earnings at internal peers than to positive 
pre-provision earnings. This result implies that subsidiaries take advantage of the poor 
performance of internal peers to record their own lower levels of earnings, without fear of 
repercussion from the holding company. This behavior could allow subsidiaries to build future 
“cookie jar” reserves to boost low earnings in future down quarters, and lends support to the 
hypothesis that my results reflect reporting discretion at the subsidiary level, and not an unmodeled 
economic reality of the BHC or subsidiary.   
In the absence of explicit information about relevant benchmarks, I perform a number of 
additional cross-sectional analyses to further support the herding inference and explore the role 
relative performance evaluation plays in this form of reporting discretion. I find that subsidiaries 
filing their financial reports later in the reporting cycle respond to the public information of earlier 
filing internal peers. This result implies that subsidiaries use reporting discretion to herd when a 
public signal is received about the results at internal peers, consistent with prior literature (Bratten 
et al., 2016). I also find that within a BHC, smaller subsidiaries are more inclined to match 
provisions to the negative pre-provision earnings of their larger internal peers. This finding is 
consistent with prior research that shows that parents spend more time on, and invest more in, the 
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operations of their larger subsidiaries, reducing the opportunity for reporting discretion at these 
entities (Chang and Taylor, 1999). I also find that internal capital market considerations are not 
driving my results. Taken together, these results support the conclusion that the patterns of 
reporting discretion I observe are driven by relative performance evaluation motives. 
These findings provide some of the first tests of theory that look at how subsidiaries weigh 
their various reporting objectives. They also contribute to the existing bank reporting discretion 
literature by showing that competing goals underlying the reporting choices of subsidiaries can 
affect the reporting choices at the overall BHC level. I build on the initial work of Beatty and 
Harris (2001), who show that subsidiaries use realized gains and losses of securities to respond to 
both their own earnings and the earnings of their peers. My findings could explain why some 
studies find that BHCs use reporting discretion in their loan loss provision to smooth earnings 
while others do not. Tse and Tucker (2009) show that firms herd around bad news of their external 
peers; I show that similar patterns emerge internally.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides institutional background. 
Chapter 3 develops my hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses my data. Chapter 5 describes my 






Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
 
2.1 Bank Holding Companies 
A bank holding company, as defined by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, is “any 
company which has control over any bank.”1 These holding companies typically consist of one 
commercial bank subsidiary, although it is not uncommon for BHCs to consist of a number of 
commercial bank subsidiaries and other financial institutions (e.g., insurance companies, wealth 
management companies, and financing companies). While the bank holding company structure 
comes with increased regulatory scrutiny, the organizational form comes with a number of 
economies of scale and legal benefits that exist outside of the consolidated operations of their 
subsidiaries, such as the ability to issue capital, the increased ability to engage in mergers and 
acquisitions, and the ability to engage in activities (e.g., securities underwriting) and investments 
not permissible at the bank level (Federal Reserve of St. Louis, 2017). 
2.2 Regulatory Capital and Internal Markets 
BHCs and their subsidiaries are required to maintain minimum regulatory capital ratios to 
be considered adequately capitalized by their respective regulators.2 Due to these regulatory capital 
requirements, the subsidiaries must manage their own regulatory capital levels as part of their 
operations. BHCs can manage their own capital requirements, in part, through dividends or 
                                                 
 
1 12 U.S. Code § 1841.Definitions 
2 Regulation Q, 12 CFR 217, §217.10; FDIC, 12 CFR 324, §324.10(a)   
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transfers of capital from their subsidiaries. These transfers come out of subsidiary equity amounts 
when the subsidiaries are in a regulatory capital position to do so. Conversely, a BHC is also 
required to “serve as a source of financial…strength to its subsidiary banks”.3 Holding companies 
are expected to provide financial support, in the form of capital infusions, when subsidiary banks 
have failed to manage their own capital levels and are “in a weakened or failing condition”. These 
infusions may come directly out of a BHC’s excess capital, or indirectly from stronger performing 
subsidiaries through capital transfers up to the BHC, which are then allocated back down to those 
weaker subsidiaries. As a result, transfers between subsidiaries and a BHC are not a “zero-sum” 
game. A subsidiary may receive a cash infusion from the BHC without taking any cash away from 
another subsidiary if the BHC has excess cash/capital to do so. The BHC can also transfer cash 
from all of its subsidiaries to itself. 
The ability to transfer capital potentially establishes an internal structure within the BHC 
where stronger subsidiaries may be required to provide capital up to the BHC to then be 
reallocated to poorer performing subsidiaries. In my sample, however, these transfers do little, on 
average, to alter the capital ratios of the subsidiaries (see Section 4.2.3), represent a de minimis 
average decrease to a subsidiary’s balance sheet, and do not always reflect a shift of capital 
between subsidiaries, but rather an infusion of cash to the BHC from its subsidiaries. In Section 
3.2, I develop hypotheses that account for how these transfers can impact my findings. 
2.3 Reporting Requirements 
Bank holding companies and all of their subsidiaries must submit quarterly financial 
statements with the FDIC.  The subsidiaries file what is known as the Call Report and the bank 
                                                 
 
3 52 Fed. Reg. 15707, April 30, 1987, effective April 24, 1987 
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holding company itself files Form FR Y9-C. These regulatory reporting requirements provide a 
rich setting for analysis, as the unconsolidated subsidiary financial statements allow for 
exploration of behaviors at the subsidiary level. Through this detail, it is possible to investigate 
whether subsidiaries behave in a manner consistent with the operations of internal peers. 
2.4 Loan Loss Provision Timing and Calculation 
An area where firms have the ability to exercise significant reporting discretion is through 
period-end accruals. Within the banking industry, one of the most important (and scrutinized) 
period-end accruals is the loan loss provision, which adjusts the subsidiary’s allowance for loan 
and lease losses. This expense entry represents 13% of recorded total interest expense for financial 
institutions.4  
As a period-end accrual, the timing of the entry makes it susceptible to significant 
discretion in its calculation and reporting (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Nicoletti, 2018; Tomy, 
2019). The allowance for loan and lease losses is calculated by subsidiaries at the end of the 
reporting period when pre-provision earnings levels are known to management, which allows 
subsidiaries to exercise reporting discretion in the loan loss provision to arrive at targeted 
earnings levels based on this knowledge. The timing of the entry also provides the subsidiary 
with the ability to respond to information obtained through private or public channels about its 
internal (or external) peers. Additionally, as this accrual is an estimate based on projected losses 
in the portfolio, there is opportunity to exercise discretion through various assumptions used in 
the calculation to arrive at a desired period-end expense. 
                                                 
 
4 Averages obtained from the UBPR Peer Group Average Report as of 12/31/2019, FFEIC.gov 
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Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Earnings Smoothing  
Evidence on the use of reporting discretion at the BHC level to smooth earnings is mixed, 
leaving it an open question if BHC subsidiaries use reporting discretion in their own loan loss 
provisions to smooth earnings.5 Beatty and Harris (2001) provide some initial evidence of 
subsidiaries exercising discretion to smooth earnings, finding that subsidiaries record higher gains 
on sales of available-for-sale securities when earnings are low. These considerations lead to my 
first empirical hypothesis: 
H1: Bank Holding Company subsidiaries use reporting discretion to smooth earnings 
(i.e., record higher loan loss provisions when pre-provision earnings are high) 
3.2 Peer Evaluation and Endogeneity Concerns 
In addition to smooth earnings, subsidiaries are also concerned with being evaluated 
relative to a peer set (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). These 
comparisons can be to either internal or external sets of peers. While internal relative performance 
has been modeled using tournament theory, subsidiaries may not have the autonomy to use 
reporting discretion to win the tournament (Bonacchi et al., 2014; Beuselinck et al., 2019). I 
therefore test the following empirical hypothesis: 
 
H2: Bank Holding Company subsidiaries use reporting discretion to match performance 
at internal peers (i.e., record lower loan loss provisions when internal peer pre-provision 
earnings are high) 
 
 
                                                 
 
5 While many have shown a positive relation between pre-provision earnings and the loan loss provision, consistent with the 
earnings smoothing hypothesis (Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 2002; Liu and Ryan, 2006; Bushman and Williams, 2012), 
others have found an insignificant or negative relation between these two amounts (Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999). 
Balboa et al. (2013) consider a non-linear relationship between the provision and earnings to explain these finding. 
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There is an alternative economic effect that may drive herding behavior. If the BHC moves 
cash between subsidiaries for performance or capital reasons, the performance of one subsidiary 
could be endogenous to that of its internal peers. One could argue that in this instance, the poorly 
performing subsidiary receives help from the BHC and therefore may not need to use reporting 
discretion to herd around its internal peers. This would likely work against H2.  
To illustrate and control for this concern, I first provide descriptive statistics of these 
transfers in Section 4.2.3 and find that the majority of these transfers are from the subsidiaries up 
to the BHC, and rarely from one subsidiary to another. I also add two measures of inter-BHC 
transfers as controls for this alternative effect.6  
Another manifestation of endogeneity when a BHC transfers cash from one subsidiary to 
others is that the performance of those recipients could be endogenous to the transferring 
subsidiary’s performance, resulting in reverse causality in H2. As just discussed, this is not an 
empirical concern. In any event, I control for this effect in H7 below, where I examine the smallest 
and largest subsidiaries of a BHC. Transferring cash from small subsidiaries is unlikely to have a 
material effect on the performance of other bigger subsidiaries, and reverse causality is unlikely to 
be a concern in this cross-section.  
The existence of a relation between subsidiary provisions and the earnings components of 
internal peers may also be driven by some correlated omitted variable, such as the performance of 
an external set of peers, whose inclusion could eliminate the results supporting H2. However, the 
performance of non-peers should not be a factor in subsidiary reporting discretion. This leads to 
two additional hypotheses related to peer evaluation and reporting discretion: 
                                                 
 
6 I thus assume that these transfers are exogenous to related subsidiary performance. Explicitly modeling the BHC’s choice to 




H3: Bank Holding Company subsidiaries use reporting discretion to match performance 
at internal peers, in addition to any response to external peer performance (i.e., record 
lower loan loss provisions when internal peer pre-provision earnings are high) 
 
H4: Bank Holding Company subsidiaries do not use reporting discretion to match 
performance to randomized internal or external peers (i.e., do not record lower loan loss 
provisions when randomized internal peer pre-provision earnings are high) 
 
3.3 Asymmetric Response 
Herding research predicts a symmetric response, showing firms take steps to shield 
themselves from the bad news of peers by reporting similarly, or imitate good news to dispel any 
potential negative information about the firm (Desir, 2012). However, the presence of “big bath” 
motivations may lead subsidiaries to bring forward losses from future periods into a current period 
where they already expect losses (Moerhle, 2002). Bank holding companies have been shown to 
use reporting discretion to achieve this goal (Fiechter and Meyer, 2010), and Balboa et al. (2013) 
suggest that this behavior is consistent with compensation and relative performance incentives. 
Subsidiaries may thus respond more to negative pre-provision earnings at internal peers, resulting 
in a one-sided association between a subsidiary’s loan loss provision and the pre-provision 
earnings of its internal peers. This leads to my fifth hypothesis:    
 
H5: Bank Holding Company subsidiaries respond more strongly to negative pre-provision 
earnings at internal peers (i.e., record larger loan loss provisions when internal peer pre-
provision earnings are negative) 
 
The hypotheses above are motivated by herding theories, whose main underlying economic 
force is relative performance evaluation. As the details of subsidiary compensation, incentive, and 
promotion plans are limited in my sample, I examine the relative performance evaluation 
motivation through additional cross-sectional tests.  
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I start with the observation that late filers are more likely to follow the actions of early 
filers in an attempt to be viewed comparably to those early filing peers (Bratten et al., 2016). Once 
the financial information of the first filing subsidiary is available, a late filing subsidiary can 
respond to this information with closing-entry adjustments to its own loan loss provision to meet 
its own reporting objective (see Section 2.4). This leads to my first cross-sectional hypothesis: 
H6:  The response to negative pre-provision earnings is one-sided: the last filing subsidiary 
of a BHC will record a larger loan loss provision to match negative pre-provision earnings 
at its earlier filing peers  
 
Subsidiary size also plays a role in subsidiary behavior. Larger subsidiaries, given their 
size, may be expected to deliver a certain level of earnings for the BHC, and concern themselves 
less with relative comparison to their smaller subsidiaries. Additionally, the BHC monitors the 
larger subsidiary more closely, leaving them with less autonomy in reporting discretion than their 
smaller peers (Chang and Taylor, 1999).  
Furthermore, as discussed in the motivation for H2, reverse causality is a potential concern 
due to internal cash transfers. Transfers from small subsidiaries are unlikely to have a material 
effect on the performance of larger subsidiaries, and reverse causality is unlikely to be a concern 
in this situation. This leads to my second and final cross-sectional hypothesis: 
H7:  The response to negative pre-provision earnings is one-sided: the smallest 
subsidiary of a BHC will record a larger loan loss provision to match negative pre-
provision earnings at its larger peers 
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Chapter 4 Data and Methodology 
4.1 Sample 
My sample consists of 1,245 subsidiaries from 505 bank holding companies with 
reporting periods ending between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2018. I obtain all financial 
data from regulatory Call Reports filed with the FDIC by subsidiaries during this time period. I 
identify subsidiary holding company affiliation through report item RSSD9364, which identifies 
the “Financial High Holder ID,” or the institution that represents the “highest level relation” of 
the individual bank (Liao et al., 2020). Within each quarter, subsidiaries are grouped by this 
BHC relation identifier for the purposes of identifying subsidiaries that are part of a bank holding 
company with more than one subsidiary. I restrict my primary sample to all subsidiaries 
connected to one or more internal peers through a BHC.7 I exclude from my main sample banks 
that are part of a bank holding company with more than ten subsidiaries due to the potential 
complexities of the interrelations that may exist at these institutions. 
4.2 Summary Statistics 
4.2.1 Overall Sample 
Table 1, Panel A, provides summary statistics on the holding company structure of my 
sample population. Slightly over half of the subsidiaries are part of a BHC with two commercial 
bank subsidiaries, with 85% of the sample belonging to BHCs with between two and four bank 
subsidiaries.  
                                                 
 
7 For my analysis in Table 3 of smoothing at the holding company level, I include all BHCs, including bank holding companies 
with only one subsidiary, resulting in a sample of 5,737 BHCs 
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Table 1, Panel B, provides summary statistics for the individual subsidiaries in my sample. 
On average, these subsidiaries recognize positive net income, with Earnings Before Provision8 of 
0.006, netted against average Loan Loss Provisions of 0.001. These compare to averages of 0.006 
and 0.002 in analyses performed by Beatty and Liao (2014), using bank-quarters from 1993 to 
2012. Annualized, these also compare to the summary statistics of those in Bushman and Williams 
(2012), who find average Earnings Before Provisions (Loan Loss Provisions) of 0.030 (0.005). 
Similarly, looking at a subsidiary’s internal peer subsidiaries, Internal Peer Earnings Before 
Provision and Internal Peer Provision are also 0.006 and 0.001, providing preliminary evidence 
that there is some level of herding occurring at these subsidiaries. A subsidiary’s own level of 
Earnings Before Provision is correlated with Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision at a level 
of 0.37, and its Loan Loss Provision is correlated with Internal Peer Provision at a level of 0.39 
(Table 2). The allowance for loan and lease losses (Allowance) in the sample of 0.017 also closely 
mirrors that in the Beatty and Liao analysis (0.016). Subsidiaries in the sample have an average 
Size of 5.183, smaller than that in the Beatty and Liao analysis, but have a similar ratio of loans to 
total assets (62.5% to 62.2%). 
In my test of Hypothesis 5, I evaluate the incremental impact that negative earnings at 
internal peers have on a subsidiary’s matching behavior. I find that a subsidiary’s internal peers 
incur net losses in 10% of my subsidiary-quarter observations (Internal Peer Net Loss = 1) and 
recognize negative pre-provision earnings in 5% of my subsidiary-quarter observations (Internal 
Peer Loss Before Provision = 1). These percentages vary based on the relative size of the 
subsidiary, with the internal peers of a BHC’s largest subsidiary recording net losses (negative 
                                                 
 
8 Refer to the Appendix for definitions and calculations of all variables used in my analyses. 
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pre-provision earnings) 12% (7%) of the time, compared to only 8% (4%) of the time for the 
internal peers of a BHC’s smallest subsidiaries. 
4.2.2 Subsidiary Size Statistics 
I evaluate in Hypothesis 7 the impact that relative subsidiary size has on the herding 
behavior of subsidiaries. While on average, a subsidiary has a relative size (share of the BHC’s 
total assets) of 39%, the largest subsidiaries account for 64% of a BHC’s bank subsidiary assets, 
while the smallest subsidiaries comprise just 24% of total BHC bank subsidiary assets 
(Difference significant at p < .01). Earnings Before Provision at the largest subsidiaries (0.006) 
are also larger than those of their smallest peers (0.005) (Difference significant at p < .01). 
4.2.3 Internal Capital Transfer Statistics and Endogeneity Considerations 
As stated in Section 2.2, a main mechanism through which subsidiary performances could 
become interlinked is through internal cash transfers between the BHC and its subsidiaries. The 
BHC initiates such internal cash transfers to manage its own capital needs, as well as to provide 
financial support when subsidiary banks may be “in a weakened or failing condition”.  
In find that in my sample, 50% of subsidiary-quarter observations have net cash transfers 
from the subsidiary up to the BHC during the quarter. These transfers represent only a 0.3% 
decrease, on average, to the total assets of these subsidiaries, and a decrease of only 40 basis points, 
on average, to the average total capital ratio of 16.8%. Another 40% of subsidiary-quarter 
observations in my sample have $0 in net transfers between the subsidiary and the BHC. As with 
those subsidiaries making net transfers up to the BHC, these subsidiaries are also well-capitalized, 
with an average total capital ratio of 19.5%. 
The remaining 10% of subsidiary-quarter observations in my sample show subsidiaries 
receiving net infusions of cash from the BHC during the quarter. These cash transfers represent, 
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on average, only 0.7% of total assets, which represents just 10% of the average subsidiary-level 
standard deviation of changes in assets. As with the subsidiaries who have net outflows of cash 
during a quarter, it does not appear that this influx of cash would meaningfully alter the 
subsidiary’s performance.  
In sum, the data shows that in my sample, the majority of capital movement between 
subsidiaries and BHCs comes in the form of cash movement from the subsidiary up to the BHC 
(50% of subsidiary-quarters), and not cash infusions to subsidiaries (10% of subsidiary-quarters). 
I conclude that other subsidiaries’ performance is not endogenous to a given subsidiary’s 
performance as a result of these cash transfers. The reverse causality concerns in H2 and other 
hypotheses is mitigated. 
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Chapter 5 Results 
5.1 Subsidiary Reporting Discretion to Smooth Earnings (H1) 
To empirically test the earnings smoothing hypothesis, I use an empirical specification 
consistent with prior literature: 
Loan Loss Provisioni,t = β1Earnings Before Provisioni,t + β2Non-Performing Loan Changei,t+1 +   
                                                   β3Non-Performing Loan Changei,t + β4Non-Performing Loan Changei,t-1 + 
       β5Non-Performing Loan Changei,t-2 + β6Capitali,t-1 + β7Transfersi,t +  
 β8BHC Transfersi,t + β9Sizei,t-1 + β10Loan Changei,t + β11Allowancei,t-1 +       
β12Chargeoffi,t + β13GDP Changei,t + δSubsidiary Fixed Effectsi +  
     λQuarter Fixed Effectst + εi,t      (1) 
 
Loan Loss Provision represents the period-end expense accrual recorded by the subsidiary 
(i) to adjust the balance of its allowance for loan and lease losses (Allowance). Earnings Before 
Provision represents the pre-tax earnings of the subsidiary, excluding the Loan Loss Provision 
expense. The earnings smoothing hypothesis suggests a positive relation between these two 
covariates. 
I control for a number of subsidiary-level variables previously shown to influence the Loan 
Loss Provision. Non-Performing Loan Change captures a measure of the credit quality of the 
portfolio, and the losses that exist within the portfolio during the current quarter (t), the previous 
two quarters (t-1 and t-2), and the following quarter (t+1). I control for subsidiary total risk based 
capital ratios (Capital) and asset size (Size), which have been shown to influence loan loss 
provisions. To control for concerns around internal transfers of capital (See Sections 3.2 and 4.2.3), 
I include both Transfers, which captures the amount of capital transferred between the subsidiary 
and the BHC during a quarter, and BHC Transfers, which measures the average amount of capital 
movement between a BHC and all of its bank subsidiaries during a quarter. Loan Change captures 
any mechanical increases to the Loan Loss Provision driven by the mere presence of more loans 
on the Balance Sheet. Allowance and Charge-Offs control for two components that directly affect 
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the Loan Loss Provision expense. The Allowance has a negative relation with the Loan Loss 
Provision, as the larger the beginning balance of the Allowance, the less Loan Loss Provision 
expense will need to be recorded to obtain the desired period-end levels. Charge-offs have a 
positive relation to the Loan Loss Provision, as any amounts charged off during the quarter reduce 
the Allowance, and amounts that were not previously reserved for are recorded as a direct Loan 
Loss Provision expense. GDP Change controls for macroeconomic conditions faced by each 
subsidiary based on the counties in which the subsidiary has operations.  
I also include subsidiary-level fixed effects to control for any firm specific factors. My 
results should therefore be interpreted as within-subsidiary, and not across-subsidiary, effects. 
With regard to potential time series variability, I include quarter-level fixed effects to control for 
any time-variant factors that may affect my results. This allows for my results to be interpreted as 
showing within-quarter, and not across-quarter, effects. 
Table 3 provides a few preliminary, though mixed, insights about the earnings smoothing 
hypothesis at the BHC level, which help guide my primary analyses. First, in Column 1, the 
coefficient on Earnings Before Provision is significant and negative for the pooled sample of all 
bank holding companies, indicating the opposite of earnings smoothing at the BHC level. Column 
2 tests whether there is a difference in this behavior between bank holding companies with one 
versus many subsidiaries. I find no significant coefficient on the interaction term (Earnings Before 
Provision × Single Bank Holding Company).9 These findings suggest that there are alternative 
earnings management motivations outside of earnings smoothing that are occurring at the 
individual subsidiary level of holding companies.  
                                                 
 
9 With the inclusion of only BHC-level fixed effects, I find a significant positive coefficient on this interaction term, suggesting 
BHCs with only one subsidiary are more inclined to try to smooth earnings 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 introduce the effects of external peer group earnings on the 
reporting discretion of BHCs. These results show a significant positive relation between loan loss 
provisions of a BHC and both the pre-provision earnings and provisions of its peers. This result 
implies that there exists a relation between provisions within the banking industry, consistent with 
prior literature (Dahl, 2013), as well as a potential expectation that BHCs are inclined to smooth 
earnings when the industry performs well.  
Table 4 provides the results of estimating Equation 1 at the subsidiary level. Column 1 
presents the results of the test of H1. The significant positive Earnings Before Provision 
coefficient (0.028) suggests that subsidiaries will record larger provisions when their own pre-
provision earnings are high relative to their time-series mean (subsidiary-level fixed effects). The 
results also reflect a within-quarter, and not across-quarter, effect that controls for variability in 
provisions and all other variables over time (quarter fixed effects). This is consistent with 
subsidiaries exercising reporting discretion to smooth their own earnings. Economically, a one 
standard deviation increase in average Earnings Before Provision results in a 12.0% increase to 
the Loan Loss Provision, and a 10% increase in Earnings Before Provision results in a 1.2% 
increase in the Loan Loss Provision.10  I conclude that subsidiaries use reporting discretion to 
smooth their own earnings. 
                                                 
 
10 This finding is greater than that of Collins et al. (1995), who find a standard deviation increase in annual earnings before 
provision leads to a 2.5% increase in the provision, though their sample dates back prior to 1991. Similarly, Liu and Ryan 
(2006) find that being in the high income (above median) group in their sample results in a 1% increase in provision. 
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5.2 Response of Subsidiaries to the Performance of their Peers 
5.2.1 Response of Subsidiaries to the Performance of Internal Peers (H2) 
In my test of H2, I modify Equation 1 to include the primary covariates of interest that 
relate to the overall level of earnings, and components of earnings, at a BHC subsidiary’s internal 
peers – Internal Peer Net Income, Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision, and Internal Peer 
Provision. I calculate these variables as the sum of the value of this variable across all related BHC 
subsidiaries, less the value of subsidiary i, divided by the sum of the lagged total loans of all related 
BHC subsidiaries, less the loans at subsidiary i: 






Where X takes the value of Net Income, Earnings Before Provision, or Loan Loss Provision. As 
noted in Section 4.2.3, I view the Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision as exogenous to a given 
subsidiary’s provision, which validates the inclusion of this regressor. 
Columns 2 through 4 of Table 4 present the results of the test of H2. The significant 
negative coefficient (-0.053) in Column 2 suggests that subsidiaries herd around income levels of 
their internal peers – when related subsidiary net income is high (relative to its time-series mean), 
a subsidiary will record lower levels of provision to minimize decreases to its own pre-provision 
earnings. Within the framework of the herding literature, this result suggests subsidiary managers 
are concerned with how they are viewed relative to their holding company peers.  
Economically, a one standard deviation increase in Internal Peer Net Income leads to a 
reduction in the Loan Loss Provision of 23%. Taken together with the coefficient on Earnings 
Before Provision, these two coefficients result in a reduction in the Loan Loss Provision of 8.6% 
as the result of a one standard deviation increase in these two measures, eliminating the impact of 
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the earnings smoothing result found in Column 1. This net result suggests that subsidiaries are 
more responsive to the incentives of relative performance evaluation than they are to their own 
desire for smooth earnings.   
Column 3 of Table 4 shows a significant negative coefficient on Internal Peer Earnings 
Before Provision (-0.024). As with the Internal Peer Net Income result, this result suggests that 
subsidiaries respond to the pre-provision level of earnings of their internal peers in a direction 
opposite the earnings smoothing hypothesis, but consistent with the direction suggested by the 
herding literature. Subsidiaries respond to higher levels of pre-provision earnings at their internal 
peers by taking smaller provisions. In an environment where these subsidiaries may be 
communicating with each other during the reporting period, or sending signals to each other about 
their earnings prior to their final accruals (Alonso et al., 2008), these subsidiaries respond by 
attempting to match each other’s performance. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision leads to a 8.6% decrease in Loan Loss Provision.11  
In Column 4, I add a measure to capture the provisions of internal peers (Internal Peer 
Provision). Each subsidiary manages its provisions around the related performance of its internal 
peers, and therefore, the internal peer provision may be endogenous. With this caution, I find a 
significant positive coefficient (0.122). This result suggests that as its internal peers book larger 
provisions, so too will the subsidiary of interest, even after controlling for determinants of the 
provision at the subsidiary level. Here, a one standard deviation increase in Internal Peer 
                                                 
 
11 These results are consistent with the prior literature that looks at the behavior of firms matching the actions of those within their industry or peer 
group. Tse and Tucker (2009) show that 60% of follower firms issue earnings warnings following a similar announcement by a peer firm. Similarly, 
Bratten et al. (2016) find that follower firms report earnings per share $0.28 lower when the industry leader reports losses, and that followers are 
5% more likely to beat earnings when the leader beats its earnings target compared to a “neutral” announcement. 
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Provision represents a 27% increase in Loan Loss Provision. Importantly, even with the 
inclusion of Internal Peer Provision as an additional covariate, the significant result on Internal 
Peer Earnings Before Provision remains. I conclude from these results that herding around the 
earnings of internal peers is an important objective for these subsidiaries.12 
5.2.2 Response of Subsidiaries to the Performance of External Peers (H3) 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 introduce measures of external peer performance to capture 
the effect that external peer groups have on subsidiary behavior. In Column 5, the significant 
negative coefficient (-0.088) on External Peer Net Income is consistent with the hypothesis that 
subsidiaries will herd around the earnings of their peers. Column 6 breaks External Peer Net 
Income out into its component pieces, External Peer Earnings Before Provision and External 
Peer Provision. Where the coefficient on Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision in Columns 3 
and 4 was significantly negative, the coefficient on External Peer Earnings Before Provision is 
significant and positive. The direction of this coefficient is more in line with the smoothing 
behavior seen in Section 5.2, and perhaps reflects that, on the whole, banks in the industry have a 
first order priority to smooth earnings. From these results I conclude that, even after the inclusion 
of external peer group performance, the motivation to match earnings of internal peers is still an 
important objective for these subsidiaries. Consistent with prior findings, I also conclude that 
provisions across both internal and external peers provide a relevant benchmark for subsidiaries 
(Dahl, 2013). 
                                                 
 




5.3 Response of Subsidiaries to the Performance of Random Peers (H4) 
I next further confirm my herding results using a falsification analysis.  In Table 5, 
Columns 1 and 2, the insignificant coefficients on the Randomized Internal Peer variables 
suggests that there is no economic relation between subsidiaries and their unrelated peers. 
Column 3 adds Randomized External Peer variables, and similarly finds insignificant 
coefficients on these variables as well, suggesting that the identity of the peer group matters 
(Albuquerque, 2009). 
5.4 Response of Subsidiaries to Positive and Negative Earnings of Internal Peers (H5) 
Table 6 presents the results of the test of H5. In Column 1, on the interaction term Internal 
Peer Earnings Before Provision × Internal Peer Loss Before Provision, I find a significant 
negative coefficient (-0.044). This result suggests that subsidiaries respond more strongly to pre-
provision earnings of internal peers when those pre-provision earnings are negative.  
Column 2 repeats this analysis with the inclusion of the external peer group earnings 
measures. The negative coefficient on Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision is again 
significant, suggesting that subsidiaries are responsive to the pre-provision earnings of their 
internal peers, particularly when those earnings are negative, even after the inclusion of external 
peer performance measures. Economically, the result in Column 1 represents an incremental 
increase to the Loan Loss Provision of 16% when negative pre-provision earnings of internal peers 
decrease by one standard deviation.  
The coefficient on the interaction term, Internal Peer Provision × Internal Peer Loss 
Before Provision in both Column 1 and Column 2 is insignificant. Contrary to the positive 
coefficient on Internal Peer Provision, which indicates that provisions tend to move together, 
this result suggests that negative pre-provision earnings at internal peers may be driven by more 
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than just loan losses (i.e. goodwill impairment or fair value write-downs). This result provides 
further support for the conclusion that the herding behavior is driven by reporting discretion and 
not by an unmodeled economic reality of the BHC and its subsidiaries. 
5.5 Cross-Sectional Evaluation of Potential Herding Motivations 
5.5.1 Impact of Reporting Date on Herding Behavior (H6) 
In my first cross-sectional test of H5, I look at whether reporting discretion is indicative of 
relative performance motives, testing whether or not the response to negative pre-provision 
earnings differs across the timing of when subsidiaries file their financial statements. Using the 
reporting date from the subsidiaries’ filings, I identify the subsidiaries within a BHC who file their 
financials First (Last) based on which subsidiary filed their financials in the fewest (most) number 
of days from period-end. I then assign an indicator variable for those subsidiaries that file first 
(First Filer = 1) and last (Last Filer = 1). Due to the nature of the report file date information, 
which updates any time an amended filing is made to reflect the date of the most recent filing, I 
exclude from this analysis the subsidiaries of any BHC where the days to file for any one of its 
subsidiaries exceeds 31 days. A filing date greater than 31 days would indicate that an amendment 
was made to that filing, and would no longer capture the original filing date.  
Columns 1 – 3 of Table 7 report the results for the Last Filers within a holding company, 
while Columns 4 – 6 report results for the First Filers. The median days to file for the Last (First) 
Filers is 28 (22) days, which suggests a not insignificant number of days between filing for those 
who file last to potentially make changes to their period-end accruals. Column 2 shows a 
significant negative coefficient (-0.192) on the interaction term Internal Peer Earnings Before 
Provision × Internal Peer Loss Before Provision. This result suggests that those subsidiaries who 
file their financial statements last among those in the BHC respond more strongly to negative pre-
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provision earnings at their internal peers when those peers have already publicly disclosed that 
information. On the other hand, this coefficient in Column 5 is not significant, suggesting that 
those filing first may not have the full information set to respond to the negative pre-provision 
earnings of their peers, or that that information is not as relevant to their decision-making process.  
The coefficient on Internal Peer Provision × Internal Peer Loss Before Provision for 
both groups is insignificant, indicative of no additional herding around provisions when internal 
peers report negative pre-provision earnings.  These results also further support the implication 
that my results reflect reporting discretion at the subsidiary level for relative performance 
evaluation purposes, and not some unmodeled economic reality of the BHC and its subsidiaries. 
5.5.2 Relative Subsidiary Size (H7) 
I next test whether or not the response to negative pre-provision earnings differs across the 
smallest and largest subsidiaries of a BHC. To determine the smallest and largest subsidiaries, I 
calculate the Relative Size of each subsidiary, calculated as the average of total assets over the 
prior 4 quarters, divided by the average of total BHC assets over the that same time. I then rank 
subsidiaries by Relative Size, with the subsidiary with the smallest (largest) share of BHC assets 
identified as Smallest Subsidiary = 1 (Biggest Subsidiary = 1). 
Table 8 presents the results of the test of H7. Columns 1 – 3 report the results of the 
regressions for the smallest subsidiaries, while Columns 4 – 6 report the results for the largest 
subsidiaries. Column 2 reports a significant negative coefficient (-0.044) on the interaction term 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision × Internal Peer Loss Before Provision. This result 
suggests that the smallest subsidiaries of a holding company are likely to respond more strongly 
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to pre-provision earnings of internal peers when those pre-provision earnings are negative.13 By 
contrast, this coefficient is not significant in Column 5. This result suggests that larger subsidiaries 
are less inclined (or able) to herd around losses at their smaller counterparts.  
The coefficient on Internal Peer Provision × Internal Peer Loss Before Provision for 
both groups is insignificant, indicative of no additional herding around provisions when internal 
peers report negative pre-provision earnings. Taken together, these findings can be interpreted as 
the smaller subsidiaries using more discretion to decrease earnings when their larger subsidiaries 
have negative pre-provision earnings. As in Table 6, the inclusion of External Peer Earnings 
Before Provision and External Peer Provision (Columns 3 and 6) does not alter the behavior of 
the subsidiaries in response to internal peer performance in a meaningful way, and supports the 
conclusion that this reporting discretion is driven by relative performance considerations. 
5.6 Robustness Tests 
I perform a number of robustness checks to test the strength of my findings. First, in 
place of Earnings Before Provision, I use a measure of the quarter over quarter change in 
earnings, finding no significant differences in my results (e.g., the coefficient on the interaction 
term Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision × Internal Peer Loss Before Provision is -0.045 
and significant, the same as in Table 6, Column 2). Second, I rescale my income variables by 
total assets, as opposed to total loans, with no change to my overall results. Third, and finally, I 
alter my peer groups to reflect only asset size peers, as well as state peers, with no qualitative 
change to my conclusions. 
                                                 
 
13 Note that the performance of other larger subsidiaries can be considered exogenous to the smaller subsidiary’s performance, 
as discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4.2.3. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I find that while bank holding company subsidiaries record larger loan loss 
provisions when pre-provision earnings are high relative to their time-series mean (consistent 
with earnings smoothing), they also respond to the performance of internal peers in the holding 
company by recording higher loan loss provisions when the pre-provision earnings of internal 
peers are low, relative to their time-series mean. Through a number of cross-sectional tests, I find 
that this behavior appears to be driven by relative performance evaluation considerations, as 
opposed to other potential herding motivations or unmodeled economic realities faced by the 
holding company and its subsidiaries. These findings explain some of the prior mixed results on 
earnings smoothing at the bank holding company level, and illustrate the importance of 









Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Unit of Observation Definition Source 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
Loan Loss Provision is the value of the Loan Loss Provision, obtained from item RIAD4230 on the call report, 
scaled by total loans (RCON2122) Call Report (see also Beatty and Liao 2014) 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
Earnings before Provision represents pre-tax earnings, excluding the Loan Loss Provision. The value is 
calculated as items RIAD4301 + RIAD4230 from the subsidiary's call report, and scaled by total loans Call Report (see also Beatty and Liao 2014) 
 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Internal Peer Net Income is equal to (Sum of BHC subsidiary net income less net income from subsidiary 
i)/(Sum of BHC subsidiary total loans less total loans of subsidiary i). Subsidiaries of a BHC are identified as 
subsidiaries who share a top level holding company identified by RSSD9364 in regulatory filings.  Call Report 
 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 
𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision is equal to (Sum of BHC subsidiary Earnings Before Provision less 
Earnings Before Provision from subsidiary i)/(Sum of BHC subsidiary total loans less total loans of subsidiary 
i). Subsidiaries of a BHC are identified as subsidiaries who share a top level holding company identified by 
RSSD9364 in regulatory filings. Call Report 
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Internal Peer Provision is equal to (Sum of BHC subsidiary Loan Loss Provision less the Loan Loss Provision 
from subsidiary i)/(Sum of BHC subsidiary total loans less total loans of subsidiary i). Subsidiaries of a BHC 
are identified as subsidiaries who share a top level holding company identified by RSSD9364 in regulatory 
filings Call Report 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Randomized Internal Peer Net Income is a randomly assigned value of Internal Peer Net Income to Subsidiary i 
in quarter t from the population of Internal Peer Net Income that exists in the sample. All random values are 
assigned without replacement. Generated 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Randomized Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision is a randomly assigned value of Internal Peer Earnings 
Before Provision to Subsidiary i in quarter t from the population of Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision 
that exists in the sample. All random values are assigned without replacement. Generated 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼  
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Randomized Internal Peer Provision is a randomly assigned value of Internal Peer Provision to Subsidiary i in 
quarter t from the population of Internal Peer Provision that exists in the sample. All random values are 
assigned without replacement. Generated 
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑂 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (1/0) 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Internal Peer Net Loss is an indicator variable equal to 1 if Internal Peer Net Income is less than zero during the 
quarter, and equal to 0 if Internal Peer Net Income is greater than or equal to zero Call Report 
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   (1/0)  
 Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Internal Peer Loss Before Provision is an indicator variable equal to 1 if Internal Peer Earnings Before 
Provision is less than zero during the quarter, and equal to 0 if Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision is 
greater than zero Call Report 




External Peer Earnings Before Provision represents the average earnings before provision of subsidiaries, 
quarterly, within a subsidiary’s peer group, constructed by asset size and OCC district. Banks are assigned an 
asset size peer group based on FDIC classifications, which include: Assets < $100M, Assets between $100M 
and $300M, Assets between $300M and $1B, Assets between $1B and $3B, Assets between $3B and $10B, 
and Assets > $10B. OCC Districts are broken up geographically into 4 regions: Central, Southern, 
Northeastern, and Western. Banks are assigned into one of 24 potential peer groups based on size and 
geographic region. Call Report, Summary of Deposits 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
External Peer Provision represents the average provision of subsidiaries, quarterly, within a subsidiary’s peer 
group, constructed by asset size and OCC district. Banks are assigned an asset size peer group based on FDIC 
classifications, which include: Assets < $100M, Assets between $100M and $300M, Assets between $300M 
and $1B, Assets between $1B and $3B, Assets between $3B and $10B, and Assets > $10B. OCC Districts are 
broken up geographically into 4 regions: Central, Southern, Northeastern, and Western. Banks are assigned 
into one of 24 potential peer groups based on size and geographic region. Call Report, Summary of Deposits 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Randomized External Peer Earnings Before Provision is a randomly assigned value of External Peer Earnings 
Before Provision to Subsidiary i in quarter t from the population of External Peer Earnings Before Provision 
that exists in the sample. All random values are assigned without replacement. Generated 




Randomized External Peer Provision is a randomly assigned value of External Peer Provision to Subsidiary i in 
quarter t from the population of External Peer Provision that exists in the sample. All random values are 




𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
Non-Performing Loan Change is calculated as the sum of all non-performing loans by loan type, scaled by total 
loans (RCON2122) in the current quarter minus total non-performing loans, scaled by total loans, in the prior 




Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
Capital is the subsidiary's Total Risk Based Capital Ratio, calculated as Total Capital (RCON3792 or 




Transfers is the sum of the components of a subsidiary’s changes in Bank Equity Capital (RIADB509, 
RIADB510, RIAD4356, RIAD4470, RIAD4460, and RIAD4415) scaled by Total Equity (RCON3792 or 




BHC Transfers is calculated as the average value of Transfers for all subsidiaries in a given BHC, and 
represents average transfer activity of the BHC and its subsidiaries during a quarter. Call Report 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) Size is calculated as the natural log of total assets (RCON2170) at quarter-end  Call Report 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
Loan Change is calculated as total loans (RCON2122) scaled by lagged total assets (RCON2170) minus total 
loans scaled by lagged total assets in the prior quarter Call Report (see also Beatty and Liao 2014) 
𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) Allowance is the Allowance for Loan Loss (RCON3123) scaled by total loans (RCON2122) Call Report (see also Beatty and Liao 2014) 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒 − 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) Charge-Offs is the total loan charge-offs during the quarter (RIAD4635) scaled by total loans (RCON2122) Call Report (see also Beatty and Liao 2014) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
GDP is a measure of GDP faced by a subsidiary's customers, calculated as the weighted average of the GDP of 
the counties where a subsidiary has a branch location. Weights are allocated to subsidiary branches by dividing 
the deposits at the branch (obtained from the subsidiary's annual Summary of Deposits filing) by total 
subsidiary deposits. GDP figures, by county, are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. GDP is scaled 
by 1,000,000. Summary of Deposits and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), Bank 
Holding Company 
(b), Quarter (t) 
GDP Change is calculated as GDP in the current quarter (see definition of GDP above) minus lagged GDP, 
divided by lagged GDP Summary of Deposits and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒 𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵  




Single Bank Holding Company is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of commercial bank 
subsidiaries connected to the top level holding company identifier (RSSD9364) is equal to 1. This indicator 
variable equals zero if the number of commercial bank subsidiaries is greater than 1. Call Report 
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒  
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Relative Size is equal to (Average Assets for prior 4 quarters at subsidiary i)/(Sum of BHC Average Assets for 
prior 4 quarters). Subsidiaries of a BHC are identified as subsidiaries who share a top level holding company 
identified by RSSD9364 in regulatory filings.   Call Report 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 (1/0) 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Smallest Subsidiary is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a subsidiary in a BHC has the smallest trailing 4-
quarter total assets of all subsidiaries in the BHC (Relative Size). This variable is 0 if the subsidiary does not 
have the smallest Relative Size of all subsidiaries in the BHC. Call Report 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 (1/0) 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Biggest Subsidiary is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a subsidiary in a BHC has the smallest trailing 4-quarter 
total assets of all subsidiaries in the BHC (Relative Size). This variable is 0 if the subsidiary does not have the 
biggest Relative Size of all subsidiaries in the BHC. Call Report 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (1/0) 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
First Filer is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary filed its financial report first out of the 
subsidiaries within its BHC. The order of filing firms within a BHC is determined by the number of days after 
period-end each subsidiary filed its financial report. This variable is 0 if the subsidiary is not the first filer in 
the BHC. Call Report 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (1/0) 
Subsidiary (i), 
Quarter (t) 
Last Filer is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subsidiary filed its financial report last out of the subsidiaries 
within its BHC. The order of filing firms within a BHC is determined by the number of days after period-end 




























Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Subsidiary-Level Measures for 1,245 Subsidiaries from 
505 Multi-Bank Holding Companies, from 2009 to 2018 
 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the subsidiary structure of the Bank Holding Companies. Panel B provides 
the descriptive statistics for the subsidiary-level variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile by quarter-end date. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 









































 Panel A:   
   
Number of BHCs 505  
Number of Subsidiaries 1,245  
   
Number of BHC Subsidiaries Percent of Sample  
2 54%  
3 20%  
4 11%  
5 5%  
6 4%  
7 2%  
8 1%  
9 1%  
10 2%  
 
 Panel B:                 
  N Mean St. Dev Min 25% Med 75% Max 
Loan Loss Provisioni,t                   25,043  0.001 0.003 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.050 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t                   25,043  0.006 0.006 -0.052 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.045 
Internal Peer Net Incomei,t                   25,043  0.005 0.006 -0.052 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.061 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t                   25,043  0.006 0.005 -0.037 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.075 
Internal Peer Provisioni,t                   25,043  0.001 0.003 -0.014 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.037 
Internal Peer Net Lossi,t (1/0)                   25,043  0.104 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t (1/0)                   25,043  0.049 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t                   25,043  0.006 0.002 -0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.032 
External Peer Provisioni,t                   25,043  0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.015 
NPL Changei,t                   25,043  0.000 0.008 -0.045 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.063 
Capitali,t-1                   25,043  0.178 0.087 0.071 0.131 0.155 0.193 0.972 
Sizei,t-1                   25,043  5.178 1.261 2.529 4.350 4.984 5.784 11.202 
Loan Changei,t                   25,043  -0.001 0.043 -0.345 -0.021 -0.001 0.019 0.276 
Allowancei,t-1                   25,043  0.017 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.014 0.019 0.094 
Chargeoffsi,t                   25,043  0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.039 
GDP Changei,t                   25,043  0.009 0.015 -0.086 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.318 
Transfersi,t                   25,043  -0.007 0.044 -0.248 -0.017 -0.001 0.000 0.584 
BHC Transfersi,t                    25,043  -0.007 0.031 -0.212 -0.016 -0.006 0.000 0.534 
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Table 2: Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix for Subsidiary-Level Pre-Provision Earnings and Provision Measures using 
Quarterly Data for 1,245 Subsidiaries from 505 Multi-Bank Holding Companies, from 2009 to 2018 
 
This table provides the Spearman (Pearson) correlations above (below) the diagonal. ***, **, * denotes correlations significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 level. Correlations are calculated on the subsidiary-level quarter-end values. All variables are defined in the Appendix.   
 
          
  Loss Loss Provisioni,t Earnings Before Provisioni,t 
Internal Peer  
Earnings Before Provisioni,t Internal Peer Provisioni,t 
Loss Loss Provisioni,t  1.000 0.007 -0.048*** 0.401*** 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t -0.017*** 1.000 0.429*** -0.026*** 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t -0.061*** 0.373*** 1.000 0.015** 





Table 3: The Effect of Bank Holding Company Pre-Provision Earnings, and External Peer Pre-Provision Earnings and 
Provisions on Bank Holding Company Loan Loss Provisions using Quarterly Data for 5,737 Bank Holding Companies, from 
2009 to 2018 
 
This table uses the quarter-end bank holding company-level values for all variables. All variables are analogous to those defined in the Appendix at the 
subsidiary level. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. 
 
           
  Prediction Loan Loss Provisionb,t 
      
Earnings Before Provisionb,t + -0.022* -0.043** -0.041** -0.048** 
  (-1.972) (-2.224) (-2.207) (-2.402) 
Single Bank Holding Companyb,t +/-  -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000 
   (-4.498) (-3.405) (0.258) 
Earnings Before Provisionb,t +  0.023 0.018 0.025 
× Single Bank Holding Companyb,t   (1.359) (1.079) (1.424) 
      
External Peer Earnings Before Provisionb,t +/-   0.056** 0.160*** 
    (2.488) (2.826) 
External Peer Provisionb,t +   0.434*** 0.414*** 
    (12.204) (11.557) 
External Peer Earnings Before Provisionb,t +/-    -0.113** 
× Single Bank Holding Companyb,t     (-2.248) 
      
External Peer Provisionb,t +/-    0.031 
× Single Bank Holding Companyb,t     (1.029) 
           
Observations  172,029 172,029 172,029 172,029 
Adjusted R-squared  0.620 0.621 0.625 0.625 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BHC Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering  BHC, Quarter  BHC, Quarter  BHC, Quarter  BHC, Quarter  
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Table 4: The Effect of Own Subsidiary and Internal (External) Peer Pre-Provision Earnings and Provisions on Loan Loss 
Provisions using Quarterly Data for 1,245 Subsidiaries from 505 Multi-Bank Holding Companies, from 2009 to 2018 
 
This table uses the quarter-end subsidiary-level values for all variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denotes coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. 
 





































               
  Prediction Loan Loss Provision 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t + 0.028** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 
  (2.610) (3.419) (2.946) (3.178) (3.319) (2.986) 
Internal Peer Net Incomei,t -  -0.053***     
   (-5.324)     
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t -   -0.024** -0.023** -0.022** -0.022** 
    (-2.269) (-2.258) (-2.219) (-2.210) 
Internal Peer Provisioni,t +    0.122*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 
     (8.118) (8.151) (8.341) 
External Peer Net Incomei,t +/-     -0.088***  
      (-5.429)  
External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t +/-      0.021 
       (1.103) 
External Peer Provisioni,t +      0.427*** 
       (7.673) 
NPL Changei,t+1  0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
  (4.340) (4.412) (4.357) (4.225) (4.242) (4.225) 
NPL Changei,t  0.060*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 
  (6.775) (7.002) (6.822) (6.917) (6.944) (6.972) 
NPL Changei,t-1  0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
  (4.601) (4.729) (4.654) (4.603) (4.637) (4.561) 
NPL Changei,t-2  0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
  (4.616) (4.600) (4.658) (4.459) (4.479) (4.367) 
Transfersi,t  0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (2.516) (3.144) (2.663) (3.039) (3.064) (2.775) 
BHC Transfersi,t  -0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
  (-0.519) (-1.836) (-0.714) (-2.176) (-2.216) (-2.348) 
Capitali,t-1  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.395) (-0.234) (-0.370) (-0.137) (-0.100) (-0.066) 
Sizei,t-1  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.737) (0.701) (0.770) (0.559) (0.768) (0.641) 
Loan Changei,t  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (3.517) (3.051) (3.504) (3.434) (3.600) (3.641) 
Allowancei,t-1  -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.092*** 
  (-6.718) (-6.718) (-6.698) (-6.796) (-6.811) (-6.706) 
Chargeoffsi,t  0.680*** 0.669*** 0.679*** 0.658*** 0.656*** 0.649*** 
  (14.615) (14.593) (14.618) (14.375) (14.347) (14.090) 
GDP Change  -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* 
  (-2.690) (-2.530) (-2.529) (-2.246) (-2.041) (-1.757) 
          
Observations  25,043 25,043 25,043 25,043 25,043 25,043 
Adjusted R-squared  0.613 0.618 0.613 0.621 0.622 0.627 
Subsidiary Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering   Sub, Qtr Sub, Qtr Sub, Qtr Sub, Qtr Sub, Qtr Sub, Qtr 
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Table 5: The Effect of Own Subsidiary, Randomized Internal Peer, and Randomized External Peer Pre-Provision Earnings 
and Provisions on Loan Loss Provisions using Quarterly Data for 1,245 Subsidiaries from 505 Multi-Bank Holding 
Companies, from 2009 to 2018 
 
This table uses the quarter-end subsidiary-level values for all variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denotes coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. 
 
     
  Prediction Loan Loss Provisioni,t 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t + 0.028** 0.023** 0.028** 
  (2.608) (2.349) (2.611) 
Randomized Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t NS -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  (-0.924) (-0.881) (-1.019) 
Randomized Internal Peer Provisioni,t NS -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
  (-0.662) (-0.588) (-0.901) 
External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t +/-  0.023  
   (1.171)  
External Peer Provisioni,t +  0.460***  
   (7.844)  
Random External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t NS   0.006 
    (0.985) 
Random External Peer Provisioni,t NS   0.006 
    (0.788) 
         
Observations  25,043 25,043 25,043 
Adjusted R-squared  0.613 0.619 0.613 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering  Subsidiary, Quarter Subsidiary, Quarter Subsidiary, Quarter 
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Table 6: The Effect of Internal Peer Positive and Negative Pre-Provision Earnings, and Provisions, on Subsidiary Loan Loss 
Provisions using Quarterly Data for 1,245 Subsidiaries from 505 Multi-Bank Holding Companies, from 2009 to 2018 
 
This table uses the quarter-end subsidiary-level values for all variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denotes coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level. 
 
       
  Prediction 
  
Loan Loss Provisioni,t 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t + 0.034*** 0.029*** 
  (3.232) (3.001) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t - -0.014 -0.012 
  (-1.352) (-1.201) 
Internal Peer Provisioni,t + 0.135*** 0.126*** 
  (5.680) (5.667) 
Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t +/- 0.000 0.000 
  (0.613) (0.544) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t - -0.044* -0.047** 
× Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t  (-1.915) (-2.180) 
    
Internal Peer Provisioni,t +/- -0.051 -0.045 
× Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t  (-1.308) (-1.188) 
    
External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t +/-  0.022 
   (1.124) 
External Peer Provisioni,t +  0.426*** 
   (7.656) 
     
Observations  25,043 25,043 
Adjusted R-squared  0.622 0.627 
Controls  Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustering  Subsidiary, Quarter Subsidiary, Quarter 
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Table 7: The Effect of Subsidiary Filing Order and Internal Peer Positive and Negative Pre-Provision Earnings, and 
Provisions, on Subsidiary Loan Loss Provisions using Quarterly Filing Data for 649 Subsidiaries from 311 Multi-Bank 
Holding Companies, from 2009 to 2018 
 
Columns 1 – 3 (4 – 6) of this table tests the relationship between Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision/Internal Peer Provision and subsidiary level loan loss 
provisions (Loan Loss Provision) for the Last (First) filing subsidiary in a BHC. This table uses the quarter-end subsidiary-level values for all variables. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level. 
 
                 
  Loan Loss Provisioni,t 
  Prediction Last Filer = 1   First Filer = 1 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t + 0.004 0.005 0.004  -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 
  (0.225) (0.242) (0.215)  (-0.411) (-0.424) (-0.408) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t - -0.021 -0.004 -0.003  0.009 0.021 0.021 
  (-1.238) (-0.348) (-0.293)  (0.508) (1.112) (1.119) 
Internal Peer Provisioni,t + 0.139*** 0.130** 0.125**  0.136*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
  (2.735) (2.176) (2.068)  (3.792) (3.034) (3.016) 
Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t +/-  -0.001 -0.001   0.000 0.000 
   (-1.676) (-1.634)   (1.383) (1.360) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t -  -0.192** -0.198**   0.005 0.009 
× Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t   (-2.645) (-2.703)   (0.099) (0.160) 
         
Internal Peer Provisioni,t +/-  -0.070 -0.068   -0.024 -0.024 
× Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t   (-0.578) (-0.563)   (-0.237) (-0.231) 
         
External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t +/-   0.016    -0.048 
    (0.319)    (-1.132) 
External Peer Provisioni,t +   0.193*    -0.002 
    (1.887)    (-0.014) 
                 
Observations  3,015 3,015 3,015  3,031 3,031 3,031 
Adjusted R-squared  0.616 0.619 0.620  0.576 0.577 0.576 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 





Table 8: The Effect of Subsidiary Size and Internal Peer Positive and Negative Pre-Provision Earnings, and Provisions, on 
Subsidiary Loan Loss Provisions using Quarterly Data for 1,036 subsidiaries from 490 Multi-Bank Holding Companies, from 
2009 to 2018 
 
Columns 1 – 3 (4 – 6) of this table tests the relationship between Internal Peer Earnings Before Provision/Internal Peer Provision and subsidiary level loan loss 
provisions (Loan Loss Provision) for the Smallest (Biggest) subsidiary in a BHC. This table uses the quarter-end subsidiary-level values for all variables. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level. 
 
                 
  Loan Loss Provisioni,t 
  Prediction Smallest Subsidiary = 1   Biggest Subsidiary = 1 
Earnings Before Provisioni,t + 0.015 0.015 0.011  0.027 0.027 0.024 
  (1.156) (1.074) (0.762)  (1.528) (1.542) (1.389) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t - -0.001 0.005 0.006  -0.025 -0.018 -0.015 
  (-0.152) (0.529) (0.727)  (-1.227) (-1.103) (-0.960) 
Internal Peer Provisioni,t + 0.141*** 0.152*** 0.145***  0.080*** 0.082*** 0.073*** 
  (8.915) (7.314) (6.846)  (5.109) (8.045) (7.201) 
Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t +/-  0.000 -0.000   0.000 0.000 
   (0.013) (-0.058)   (0.068) (0.071) 
Internal Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t -  -0.044** -0.042*   -0.024 -0.032 
× Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t   (-2.157) (-2.020)   (-0.465) (-0.622) 
         
Internal Peer Provisioni,t +/-  -0.038 -0.032   -0.012 -0.005 
× Internal Peer Loss Before Provisioni,t   (-0.726) (-0.621)   (-0.301) (-0.126) 
         
External Peer Earnings Before Provisioni,t +/-   0.025    0.033 
    (0.615)    (1.355) 
External Peer Provisioni,t +   0.441***    0.370*** 
    (4.323)    (6.066) 
                 
Observations  9,447 9,447 9,447  9,714 9,714 9,714 
Adjusted R-squared  0.575 0.575 0.578  0.682 0.682 0.688 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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